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4 entries.
ken@sipantic ken@sipantic wrote on July 31, 2019 at 7:02 pm:
Sketch of The Analytical Engine Invented by Charles Babbage By L. F. Menabrea of Turin, Officer of the Military Engineers from the Bibliothèque Universelle de Genève, October, 1842, No. 82 With notes upon the Memoir by the Translator Ada Augusta, Countess of Lovelace (found here https://www.fourmilab.ch/babbage/sketch.html )
Sketch of The Analytical Engine Invented by Charles Babbage By L. F. Menabrea of Turin, Officer of the Military Engineers from the Bibliothèque Universelle de Genève, October, 1842, No. 82 With notes upon the Memoir by the Translator Ada Augusta, Countess of Lovelace (found here https://www.fourmilab.ch/babbage/sketch.html )
kenneth Hamer-Hodges kenneth Hamer-Hodges from Hillsboro Beach wrote on July 31, 2019 at 2:16 pm:
There is no doubt that software designers must be responsible for any tragedy and every death caused by the lousy design of a life-supporting system. However, cyber security starts with essential hardware redundancy needed for protection from single fault. For example, the Boeing 737 lacked input redundancy that led to single faults crippling everything else. Transparency is critical for cyber security to be achieved. Critical components in monolithic software subsystems are opaque and this secrecy put profit before safety and then blames the users. Problems now fester and escalates the next catastrophe. Passing the blame onto users is precisely how the General-Purpose Computer Science dismisses and then fails to fix every case of cyber crime in cyberspace. This book, Civilizing Cyberspace, the fight for digital democracy, evaluates these issues. The Boeing 737 catastrophe exemplifies these human failings. Such problems are the vanguard of tragedies that will beset the life-supporting applications... Read more
There is no doubt that software designers must be responsible for any tragedy and every death caused by the lousy design of a life-supporting system. However, cyber security starts with essential hardware redundancy needed for protection from single fault. For example, the Boeing 737 lacked input redundancy that led to single faults crippling everything else. Transparency is critical for cyber security to be achieved.

Critical components in monolithic software subsystems are opaque and this secrecy put profit before safety and then blames the users. Problems now fester and escalates the next catastrophe.

Passing the blame onto users is precisely how the General-Purpose Computer Science dismisses and then fails to fix every case of cyber crime in cyberspace. This book, Civilizing Cyberspace, the fight for digital democracy, evaluates these issues. The Boeing 737 catastrophe exemplifies these human failings. Such problems are the vanguard of tragedies that will beset the life-supporting applications in virtualized society.
While the responsibility and criminal liability will bring down a massive company like Boeing computer industry at large must shares responsibility and must learn lessons that lead to improvements.

Life-threatening problems will pervade virtualized society. Future generations will be run by software, life will change beyond recognition, and uncertainty will grow with increased negative consequences. To avoid this impending catastrophe, the culture of computer science must change.

Cyber security and software reliability cannot be blindly assumed. Errors must be scientifically detected, and a transparent industrial approval processes must exist. Every functional module of the software contributes to the reliability of mission-critical software. Each life-supporting application is at risk unless the MTBF (mean time between failures) is transparently measured in real time. The uncalibrated software of general-purpose computers in a Virtualized World allows false news with national impact that is even more significant threat than the Boeing 737 tragedies.

A Church-Turing Machine calibrated the MTBF of software functionality and thereby prevents unreliable software from reaching the public.
While a mediocre designs bypass some checks, a flawed design is no longer be possible. The calibrated modular, uses distributed control to simplify, complex software applications. Once designed, and tested, it can only be released to the public when the grade of service required in met. Replacing human failings with scientific transparency achieves Infallible Automation.

The quality of the software in a Church-Turing Machine can approach perfection. Engineers, through human nature, would strive for this degree of perfection driven by feedback measured by the detailed error reports from Capability Limited Addressing.
Because the software now runs on the capability rails of perfect mathematics, and because the error reports transparently inform the world from the bottom to the top, cyber society will progress towards digital perfection.
I saw this happen to significant effect at ITT when bringing the distributed control of the ITT-1240 to life in Stuttgart and Heilbron.

Any cost pressures the designers are under to cut corners and maximize
profits are checked by the objective, science of the error reports. Any upgrades are classed by the machine not a flawed human judgment to meet a management goal.
Nothing can be covered up in the way the very existence of the MCAS was hidden in the 737 catastrophes. The user is always in control and any unhealthy collusion between the supplier and the standard agency is exposed.
ken@sipantic ken@sipantic wrote on July 30, 2019 at 4:38 pm:
The PP250 was the first Capability-Based Computer.
The PP250 was the first Capability-Based Computer.
ken@sipantic ken@sipantic from Miami wrote on July 9, 2019 at 6:25 pm:
What was PP250?
What was PP250?